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CORPORATE SILENCE AND RULE 10b-5:
DOES A PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATION
HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION TO
DISCLOSE?
By ALAN L. TALEsNIcK*
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
D ISCLOSURE represents the cornerstone of federal securities
regulation. The Securities Act of 1933 requires registration
and disclosure for a public offering.' Section 14 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 requires disclosure upon solicitation
of proxy material.- Section 16 of the 1934 Act requires dis-
closure of trading by officers, directors, and major owners of a
corporation's stock3 Section 13 of the 1934 Act requires dis-
closure at the end of certain fiscal periods. 4 Rule lOb-5, pro-
mulgated under section 10(b), requires disclosure of material
corporate information by one who is buying or selling an issuer's
securities.
5
Yet is there any requirement to disclose material corporate
information when none of the above situations exists? That is,
does a corporation have an obligation to disclose material in-
formation when it is not trading in its own securities, when
it is not in the formation or the process of a public offering,
when it is not soliciting proxies, when none of its insiders are
trading in its stock, when it has not reached the end of a
reportable fiscal period, and when there are no traders taking
advantage of undisclosed material information?
A key term in the question presented is "material informa-
tion." An acknowledged standard for determining materiality
is "whether a reasonable man would attach importance [to the
fact] in determining his choice of action in the transaction."6
With this definition in mind, the presence of materiality will
*Associate, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; A.B., Harvard
College, 1967, J.D. Harvard Law School, 1972; M.B.A., Harvard Business
School, 1972.
'Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 6, 7. 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, f, g, j (1970).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970) [here-
inafter cited as SEA].
3 SEA § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
4 SEA § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
6 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
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be assumed for the purpose of this article. Therefore, the issue
in question is the following: Assuming that a corporation pos-
sesses information which is material, does the corporation have
an affirmative obligation to disclose it?
An illustration of this issue is a mining company's discovery
of a significant mineral deposit. Certainly this discovery is a
fact to which a reasonable man would attach importance in
determining whether to sell his stock in the company. The
question then becomes whether, in the absence of insider trad-
ing, the corportation must disclose its discovery to the invest-
ing public. Throughout the text, this issue will be referred
to as the "principal question," the "hypothesized situation," or
the "issue in question." The terms "affirmative disclosure" and
"affirmative duty (or obligation) to disclose" will be a short-
hand for referring to the requirement of disclosure of material
information by a corporation not involved in any of the afore-
mentioned activities.
The disclosure requirements pertaining to public offerings,
proxy solicitations, and insider trading specifically concern
the activities to which they refer and are therefore inapplicable
to the foregoing definition of affirmative disclosure. On the
other hand, the periodic and current reporting requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are not so aligned to
particular events; they will be examined in this article to deter-
mine to what extent affirmative disclosure might be accom-
plished thereunder. This examination is followed by analysis of
the timely disclosure policies of the two major stock exchanges.
Analyzing the strengths and limitations of the stock exchange
policies will help to delineate the extent to which affirmative
disclosure exists in that setting as well as the extent to which
such policies may be used as a possible source for further im-
position of a duty of affirmative disclosure. Following these
necessarily brief appraisals, the article focuses on rule 10b-5 as
the most probable source of an affirmative duty to disclose.
This consists of a detailed analysis of the text of the rule to
see if the words, on their face, provide a duty of affirmative
disclosure. The second look at rule 10b-5 is an analysis of some
of the pertinent case holdings, judicial reasoning, and SEC pro-
nouncements to see if these authorities might provide a source
for a duty of affirmative disclosure. The final section of the
article deals with the consequences resulting from affirmative
disclosure: the advantages gained and the impracticalities con-
fronted as a result of implementation.
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I. PERIODIC AND CURRENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
A. The Reports Required
Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
continuing disclosure (reporting) requirements for issuers
which fall into any of the following classifications: (1) An
issuer with a class of security registered on a national securities
exchange;7 (2) an issuer with at least $1,000,000 of total assets
and at least 500 persons who are holders of record of a class
of the company's equity security; ' or (3) any issuer which has
filed a registration statement that has become effective pur-
suant to the Securities Act of 1933 on or after August 20, 1964,
for at least one class of securities which is held of record by
300 or more persons.!' Pursuant to section 13(a) of the 1934 Act,
the SEC has the power to require registered companies to pro-
vide such information and reports as it may deem "necessary
or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to in-
sure fair dealing in the security ....,"
The rules promulgated by the Commission under section
13(a) require the filing of annual reports (form 10-K),11 quar-
terly reports (form 10-Q), r2 and current reports (form 8-K).13
The effectiveness of form 10-K in disclosing significant business
events is limited by two factors: the 12-month interval between
filings and the 4-month time lag allowed between the end of
the fiscal year and the submission of all data pertinent to the
10-K.
14
The same problems of infrequency and time lag are not as
serious with form 10-Q. It is filed quarterly and involves a
reporting time lag of 45 days.'' Form 10-Q fails as a vehicle
for current disclosure because its contents consist only of un-
certified statements of profit and loss, earnings per share,
capitalization, and stockholders' equity. There are numerous
7SEA § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
S SEA § 12(g) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1) (1970). Section 12(g) (2) does
exempt certain companies within this classification, but such exemp-
tions are not important to the discussion herein. Registration under §
12(g) (1) is no longer required if an issuer has fewer than 300 stock-
holders cf record at the end of a fiscal year.
!,SEA § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970). Companies registered under
the 1933 Act prior to August 20, 1964, are subject to the reporting re-
quirements of § 15(d) only if they had expressed an undertaking at
the original registration to adhere to such requirements.
"'SEA § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970).
11 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1972).
12 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (1972).
13 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1972).
14 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ) 31,102 (1972).
15 SEC Securities Act Release No. 9004 (Oct. 28, 1970).
1973
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material events which could occur but which would not be
reported in form 10-Q.
Form 8-K is a current, rather than a periodic, report. It
is to be filed "within ten days after the close of any month
during which any of the events specified in that form occurs
.... 1;"6 It apparently is intended to elicit disclosure of mate-
rial business occurrences, but the actual requirements of form 8-K
prevent it from attaining this objective.1 7 The form's weakness
as a current disclosure device stems from the fact that only
items 1 through 11 are mandatory. Thus the corporation has
complete discretion to decide whether to report an occurrence
under item 12 if it does not fit into any of the specific cate-
gories.' 8 The significance of this corporate discretion is illus-
trated by noting that a mineral strike by the Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Company in Canada"' failed to necessitate a form 8-K
current report. Because the discovery constituted a material
event which was not enumerated within the general instruc-
tions to form 8-K, the corporation could decide whether to
report it under item 12 as "Other Materially Important Events."
Although it seems that such events should be required in a
form 8-K, the SEC has rejected the idea of mandatory current
reporting of all material events on the grounds that (a) the
standard is vague, (b) significant risks of corporate liability
would arise, and (c) determining the occurrence of material
events would be difficult.
20
Form 8-K fails as a current report not only because of its
optional item 12, but also because it need not be filed until 10
1617 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1l (1972).
17 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. T 31,003 (1972). The following company events
are included in a current report: (1) Changes in control of ,registrant;
(2) Acquisition or disposition of assets; (3) Legal proceedings; (4)
Changes in securities; (5) Changes in security for registered securities;
(6) Defaults upon senior securities; (7) Increases in amount of securities
outstanding; (9) Options to purchase securities; (10) Revaluation of
assets or restatement of capital share account; (11) Submission of
matters to a vote of security holders; (12) Other materially important
events.
18 Id.
11) See Section I. C. infra.
20 Proposals to make mandatory the current reporting of all material
events have been rejected in the past by the commission, appar-
ently on the ground that compliance with this standard would be
very difficult because it is so vague; furthermore, it might expose
corporations to significant risks of liability. ...
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices:
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV.
1271, 1300 (1965).
Such a provision might also be difficult for the staff of the
commission to administer, as the staff would not ordinarily be in
possession of facts enabling it to determine whether a material
event had occurred.
Id. at 1300 n.133.
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days after the end of the month in which the reportable event
occurred.2 1 Nevertheless, the Wheat Report indicated that these
characteristics were not weaknesses because the SEC's current
reporting requirements "are not intended to . . . duplicate
the timely disclosure policies of the self-regulatory agencies. '22
In considering the effectiveness of the reporting require-
ments as disclosure devices, one must realize that there is a
difference between filing a report with the Commission and
publicly disclosing that report by disseminating it to the public.
Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K, insofar as they require disclosure,
require disclosure into the Commission's files rather than into
the public's awareness. Furthermore, these disclosures do not
necessarily become available even for those members of the
public who take the initiative and the trouble to seek them out.
Section 24(b) of the 1934 Act provides that the issuer may
make a written objection to public disclosure of its SEC
filings. In this situation, the Commission will make such in-
formation available to the public only when it deems that "dis-
closure of such information is in the public interest. '23 If the
Commission fails to sustain an issuer's objection to public dis-
closure of its filed reports, both the Commission 24 and the
exchange with which the issuer is listed21 shall make all infor-
mation filed under sections 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the 1934 Act avail-
able for public inspection.
Thus the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 subjects those
issuers under its jurisdiction to a very limited obligation of
continuing disclosure. Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K do contain
valuable information, but they do not create an "informed"
market at any point in time.
26
21 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 13,002 (1971).
22 SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS 332 (1969) (commonly referred to as The
Wheat Report). The Wheat Report's recommendations concentrated on
making the current reports more comprehensive in content rather than
on improving their timeliness.
2.3 SEA § 24(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78x (b) (1970).
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.80 (1972).
2517 C.FR. § 240.24b-3 (1972).
26 Former SEC Chairman Cohen has described the situation quite well:
These reports provide a permanent record of the most impor-
tant information about these corporations and a framework
within which other information can be assessed. But, the nature
and timing of these reports prevent them from serving as an
adequate medium fcr the rapid and widespread dissemination
of current material information to the investing public.
Address by Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission before the Baltimore Security Analysts Society, Jan. 6, 1969,
in '67-'69 Transfer Binder CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,652 at 83,420.
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B. Sanctions for Violation of the Reporting Requirements
Violation of the reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 can involve sanctions in the form of civil
action by both private and public parties. Section 18(a) of the
Act provides recovery of damages to any person who relied-
in the purchase or sale of a security - on a false or misleading
statement in a report filed under the Act.2" In order to recover
under section 18(a), the plaintiff must prove not only that a
statement in the report was false or misleading, but also that
the price of the security transferred was affected by the state-
ment and that his disposition of the security was in reliance
upon the statement. Even if the plaintiff presents the requisite
proof, the defendant can still prevail upon a showing that in
making the statement, "he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading."
Proving both that the statement was misleading and that
the plaintiff's purchase or sale was made in reliance on the
statement are not without difficulties. Moreover, proving a
causal relationship between any single factor and the price of
an actively traded security is "an almost impossible task with
actively traded securities. ' 2 The fact that this significant bar-
rier to recovery is followed by the availability of the good-
faith-and-lack-of-knowledge defense makes section 18 an ex-
tremely difficult and highly improbable means of penalizing
the presence of a misleading statement in a required report.
The Commission may take civil action for violation of the
reporting requirements pursuant to its authorization in section
15 (c) (4) ,21 15 (c) (5) ,3" or 19 (a) (4).31 Section 15 (c) (4) author-
izes the Commission to order an issuer to comply with the
reporting requirements of the 1934 Act after notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing. If the issuer persists in its failure to
comply, the Commission can then enforce its order in court. As
of 1968, this procedure had been utilized fewer than 10 times.
3 2
Such infrequency was probably due both to the relatively large
time period involved in implementation and to the lack of de-
terrence imposed by the actual sanction.
Sections 15(c) (5) and 19(a) (4) authorize the Commission
to suspend trading in a security for a period not exceeding 10
27 SEA § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
28 Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MicH. L. REv. 607,
627 (1964).
29 SEA § 15(c) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (c) (4) (1970).
30 SEA § 15(c) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (5) (1970).
31 SEA § 19(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (4) (1970).
32 SEC, supra note 22, at 387.
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days if "the public interest and the protection of investors so
require. '8 3 They apply, respectively, to securities not listed on
a national exchange and to securities listed on a national securi-
ties exchange. (In addition, section 19(a) (2)34 authorizes the
Commission to suspend for up to 12 months, or to withdraw,
the registration of a security for failure to comply with the
Act.) The effectiveness of these sanctions against violation of
the reporting requirements should be considerable, for their
result is serious, perhaps even extreme. Furthermore, their
effectiveness is strengthened by section 21(e), which provides
the Commission with injunctive relief by authorizing federal
district courts to compel adherence to SEC orders pursuant to
the 1934 Act.
3 5
Finally, the Commission may initiate criminal action for a
willful violation of the reporting requirements pursuant to
section 32(a) of the 1934 Act.36 Under section 32(a) a defendant
can successfully defend himself upon showing that his conduct
was not "willful." Furthermore, he can avoid imprisonment,
although not the fine, by proving that he had no knowledge
of the rule which he allegedly violated. Nevertheless, neither
of these provisions has helped defendants significantly in the
past.
37
C. Summary of Reporting Requirements
The effectiveness of the reporting requirements in achiev-
ing continuing disclosure can be summarized by consideration
of two factors: (a) the substance of the requirements and (b)
the sanctions imposed for violations. Periodic disclosure is
achieved under the Securities Exchange Act in connection with
the general longer-range reports (form 10-K and form 10-Q),
but the form 8-K has not been effective in timely reporting
of specific material events. The principal limits to its efficacy
result from four factors: (1) The time lag involved: form 8-K
does not involve immediate disclosure; (2) The limited scope
of form 8-K: an issuer has complete discretion in reporting
a material event if it is not included within one of the 11
enumerated items for form 8-K; (3) The lack of dissemination
of form 8-K reports: they are filed with the Commission with-
out further regard for public dissemination of their contents;
33SEA § 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(5) (1970); SEA § 19(a)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 78s(a) (4) (1970).
34 SEA § 19(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (2) (1970).
35 SEA § 21 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
36 The maximum penalty under this section is a $10,000 fine and two years'
imprisonment. SEA § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).
37 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 10.3 (1971).
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and (4) The limited number of companies required to file
form 8-K because of the limited applicability of the reporting
requirements: they apply only to those companies which are
subject to section 12(b), section 12(g), or section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. A final evaluation of the
substantive content of these requirements depends upon
whether one believes that their primary purpose is to provide
information which is complete or to provide information which
is timely.
The sanctions available to the Commission are certainly
adequate for the present system of disclosure. Furthermore,
sections 15(c) (5) and 19(c) (4) appear to provide the discretion
and immediacy which would be necessary for a system requir-
ing a greater degree of timely disclosure. On the other hand,
the private remedy under section 18(a) entails too many com-
plexities of proof to be practical.
II. DISCLOSURE POLICIES OF THE MAJOR STOCK EXCHANGES
A. Requirement of Timely and Adequate Disclosure
Both the New York Stock Exchange and the American
Stock Exchange have policies of timely disclosure which require
the immediate public disclosure of material information con-
cerning a listed company. The policies are designed to serve
two principal purposes: (1) public access to the information
necessary to make informed investment decisions and (2) main-
tenance of a fair and orderly securities market.38 Because the
policies are so similar, the description which follows will per-
tain to both unless otherwise indicated. 39
According to these policies of timely disclosure, the listed
company must make immediate public disclosure of any infor-
mation which might reasonably be expected to affect the mar-
ket for the company's securities. Such disclosure should be im-
plemented in a manner to reach as many people as quickly as
possible. Thus, at a minimum, release to the press and to the
wire services is contemplated. 40 The exchanges note that for
38NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-28; AMERICAN STOCK ExCHANGE GUME §§
401, 402 [hereinafter cited as ASE GUIDE].
39 Secondary sources indicate that the National Association of Securities
Dealers also has a policy of timely disclosure, but I have been unable
to locate the NASD Manual. Milton H. Cohen indicates that Section 7 of
the NASD Manual stipulates minimum requirements of timely dis-
closure for all companies desiring to be included in the NASD over-the-
counter national listing. Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1364, n.69 (1966). But this list includes only a very
small percentage of the numerous O-T-C stocks. Therefore, delisting
from this small group is not significant. Furthermore, many news-
papers add issues which they find to be of particular interest to the list
suggested by the NASD.
4 0 NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-18, A-22; ASE GUIDE §§ 402, 403.
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certain corporate developments immediate disclosure might en-
danger the company's goals, provide information helpful to a
competitor, or provide a confusing impression of a development
whose status is to become more certain almost immediately
thereafter. When there is no doubt that such a situation exists,
a company may withhold material information until the excep-
tional circumstances no longer justify failure to disclose.4' Thus,
the disclosure policies of both exchanges. presume immediate
disclosure, but can be modified by a showing that in a particu-
lar situation, the unfavorable consequences of disclosure out-
weigh the favorable.
Despite this flexibility, the policies provide that there can
be no justification for withholding material information when
unusual price and volume changes are occurring in the trading
of any of the company's securities. Under such circumstances,
the company will usually be requested by the exchange to
make any undisclosed information public at once.
4 2 If further
investigation indicates the existence of rumors which are af-
fecting trading in the company's securities, the company is re-
quired to clarify, confirm, or correct such rumors.
43
Both exchanges recommend an "open door" policy for deal-
ing with security analysts, financial writers, stockholders, and
others with an investment interest in the company. No individ-
ual or group should be given any-information concerning mate-
rial corporate developments before there has been complete
public disclosure and dissemination of such information.
4
1
B. Impact of the Stock Exchange Policies
The disclosure policy described above is included in the
listing agreement between the issuer and the exchange. Yet
the rules of the exchange are not enforced so rigorously that
each minute violation will result in a suit or penalty against
the violating company.45 If a solution to the particular problem
is unavailable or impractical under the exigencies (usually
time) present, the exchange may suspend trading in the secur-
41 NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-22; ASE GUIDE § 403.
42 NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-18; ASE GUIDE §§ 402-03.
43NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-23; ASE GUIDE §§ 402-03.
44 NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-20; ASE GUIDE § 403.
45 "[T]he Exchange looks for strict observance of the listing agreement.
However, it is realized that, occasionally, conditions will arise which
make literal compliance with one, or another, of its requirements dif-
ficult, if not impossible. In such a case the Exchange is inclined to
place the emphasis upon the spirit, rather than upon the letter, of the
agreement, and will endeavor to work out with the company some way
of relieving the difficulty, while preserving the purpose of the agree-
ment." NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-28.
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ities of the company or companies involved. If this sanction
is not sufficient, the exchange may delist the securities in-
volved.
46
Temporary suspension of trading could prove effective as a
means of assuring that the market was adequately informed
of the material information. However, its effectiveness as a
deterrent against nondisclosure depends upon a company's con-
cluding that the adverse effects of a suspension of trading,
modified by the probability that such nondisclosure would be
detected, are prohibitory. Delisting, on the other hand, is an
extreme sanction - so extreme that it cannot be used merely
to encourage or even force compliance with the timely dis-
closure policy.
The force of the stock exchange disclosure requirements
has been upheld in court. In Intercontinental Industries, Inc.
v. American Stock Exchange,47 the Fifth Circuit upheld the ex-
change's decision to enforce timely disclosure by delisting the
company involved. Yet, the Supreme Court recently held that
such rules are not binding upon the courts.
48
Thus, each of the two major exchanges has a timely dis-
closure policy with virtually all of the stipulations of affirma-
tive disclosure. Furthermore, the courts have upheld the ex-
changes' right to delist as the ultimate sanction. Yet there are
still two significant drawbacks to these policies as a source
of affirmative disclosure: (1) The policies apply only to those
companies which are listed on the two major exchanges, and
these tend to be the relatively large companies about which
more is known anyway; (2) A company can choose to be
exempt from these disclosure policies by not being listed on
either of the major exchanges.
III. RuL. 10b-5
Having examined the extent of disclosure resulting from
the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act and the timely
disclosure policies of the major exchanges, it is necessary to
consider whether rule 10b-5 imposes an affirmative duty to
disclose. The text of rule 10b-5 is reproduced below for con-
venience.
49
46 NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-29 (NYSE Rule 499); ASE GUIDE § 1002.
See also § 12(d) and Rule 12d2-1 (17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-1 (1972)) of
SEA.
47 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971).
48 "[A] policy of the New York Stock Exchange, although entitled to con-
siderable respect, cannot bind the Commission or the Courts." Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
49 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
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The first question which arises is whether a literal inter-
pretation of the words of the rule would show that failure to
execute affirmative disclosure violates its express or implied
provisions. The section on textual analysis, which follows,
attempts to ascertain such a literal interpretation.
A. Textual Analysis of Rule 10b-5
1. Introductory and Final Clauses
Clauses (1), (2), and (3) of rule 10b-5 describe the pro-
hibited activities, while the introductory and final clauses pro-
vide additional elements which must be present in order for
the rule to apply.
The introductory clause stipulates the jurisdictional means
which must be used, "directly or indirectly," if rule lOb-5 is to
be applicable. Ascertaining whether a corporation has used
"any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange"
is pragmatically difficult where neither the corporation nor its
insiders are trading. By its very nature, the act complained
of - silence - involves the use of nothing. Therefore, a nar-
row interpretation of the necessary jurisdictional means would
present a significant obstacle.
However, the courts have interpreted the jurisdictional re-
quirement rather broadly. It is not necessary that the fraud-
ulent representations be made through the mails.50 It is suffi-
cient that the securities transactions connected to the allegedly
unlawful acts or omissions otherwise involve use of the juris-
dictional means.51 Thus, a lOb-5 suit against a nonpurchasing,
nonselling corporation for failure to disclose material facts does
not present a problem of finding jurisdictional means which is
peculiar to an allegation of nondisclosure; as long as the securi-
ties transactions indirectly connected to the corporation's non-
or of any facility of a national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1972). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities Ex-
change Commission on May 21, 1942, pursuant to authority granted
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15
U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1958).
5oSee SEC v. Midland Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968) (dic-
tum).
51 See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); SEC v. Midland
Basic, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 609 (D.S.D. 1968).
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disclosure involve the proper jurisdictional means, the rule's
jurisdictional means are satisfied.
The final clause of rule lOb-5 stipulates that the alleged
violation must occur "in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security." The question raised here is whether such
clause is an attempt to require the strict privity of contract
required by common law fraud. Such an interpretation cer-
tainly would exclude application of rule 10b-5 to a corporation
which was not involved in trading, issuing, or exchanging its
shares: "literally, the 'connection' requirement seems not to be
satisfied when neither the company nor insiders are buying
or selling any securities. ' 52 Furthermore, although the rela-
tively early case of Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television
Corp.53 dismissed a complaint in which the plaintiffs did
not buy the stock until 2 weeks after the defendant insiders
had ceased selling, on the basis that at least "a semblance of
privity" is required under 10b-5, subsequent cases indicate no
reluctance to find violation of the rule even when the defend-
ant is not a purchaser or seller. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
Co.,54 despite the corporation's noninvolvement in purchasing
or selling its securities, Judge Waterman held that the "in con-
nection with" clause was satisfied because the alleged violation
by the corporation was "of a sort that would cause reasonable
investors to rely thereon, and . . . so relying, cause them to
purchase or sell a corporation's securities." This reasoning was
corroborated in Heit v. Weitzen,-' where the court found no
need for the defendant to be purchasing or selling the securi-
ties involved as long as the alleged violation had an impact
on the market. Thus, a showing that a corporation's lack of
disclosure has an impact on the market for its securities will
satisfy the "in connection with" requirement of rule 10b-5.
After having established the applicability of rule 10b-5 in
regard to the jurisdictional means and the "in connection
with" phrase, one must look to clauses (1), (2), or (3) to estab-
lish a violation of the rule.
2. Rule 10b-5, Clause (1)
Clause (1) need not be dealt with at length because it is
not only similar to but also subsumed by clause (3). Clause
(1) makes it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme or arti-
fice to defraud," whereas clause (3) proscribes engaging in
521 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 7.2(2) (1969).
5399 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
54 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
55 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968).
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"any act, practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." Clause
(3) includes all conduct falling under clause (1) in addition
to some which does not for the following reasons: First, "to
engage in any act, practice or course of business" [clause (3)]
is certainly broad enough to include all conduct covered by
"to employ any device, scheme or artifice" [clause (1)]. In
fact, the term "course of business" should be broad enough to
permit consideration of the cumulative effect of a series of acts
of which none would be fraudulent by itself.56 Second, clause
(3) includes deceit as well as fraud as an indication of a vio-
lation; clause (1) includes only the latter. Third, inclusion in
clause (1) of the infinitive phrase "to defraud" implies the
requirement of intent.57 Employment of a "scheme . . . to
defraud" necessarily involves the actor's state of mind. On the
other hand, the language of clause (3) -i.e., an "act . . .which
operates or would operate as a fraud . . . . "- is concerned
with the difficulties of proving anything about the actor's state
of mind. Accepting the above reasoning that everything that
falls within clause (1) also falls within clause (3) and fortified
by Professor Bromberg's concurrence, 58 one can proceed to an
analysis of clause (3).
3. Rule lOb-5, Clause (3)
In order to find a violation of clause (3) by a corporation
which has failed to disclose material information but which is
not purchasing or selling its shares, the allegations must satisfy
two requirements: (a) the corporation's failure to disclose must
be construed as an "act, practice or course of business," and
(b) the corporation's failure to disclose must "operate .. .as a
fraud or deceit."
Classifying a corporation's failure to disclose material in-
formation within a phrase so broad as "any act, practice or
course of business" should not be difficult. Although one could
argue that total inaction is not an "act," it is more reasonable
to assume that failure to disclose or silence itself would be
construed as an act. An even more persuasive argument is that
a corporation's failure to disclose material information consti-
tutes a "practice or course of business," since such conduct has
a definite effect on a company's creditors, competitors, and
56 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 2.6(1) (1967).
57 Note, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REV.
824, 826 (1965).
58 "Nothing comes to mind that would be in clause 1 but not in clause 3."
1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 56.
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shareholders and is therefore part of the ordinary conduct of
the corporation's business.
Further substantiation for the contention that silence can
be construed as "an act, practice or course of business" is pro-
vided by administrative and judicial authority. The SEC
has contended that an accountant's failure to disclose his dis-
covery that financial statements which he had certified 6
months earlier were false is an "act or course of business"
under rule lOb-5(3). 59 By the same token in Speed v. Trans-
america Corp.6 ° the court stated that nondisclosure can consti-
tute a violation of clause (3), thereby implying that failure
to disclose must be an "act, practice or course of business."
Although the Speed case and others 61 found nondisclosure to be
a violation of clause (3), these cases involved trading or some
other sort of advantage gained by the nondisclosing parties.
Rather than detracting from the force of the argument that
failure to disclose constitutes an "act, practice or course of busi-
ness," these holdings merely emphasize the importance of show-
ing that the hypothesized situation "operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit."
Assuming then that a corporation's failure to disclose mate-
rial information in the absence of insider or corporate trading
qualifies as an "act, practice or course of business," one must
show that such conduct "operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit." Such proof entails determining what constitutes
conduct which operates as a fraud or deceit. A careful exami-
nation of the language of clause (3) reveals that a literal in-
terpretation would not require involvement of the common law
element of fraud in proving a violation, but rather that the
only requirement of clause (3) is that the conduct in question
have the same effect - "would operate" - as that of a fraud
or deceit upon any person. Thus, under this interpretation any
conduct which has the same effect as a fraud or deceit- that
of misleading a reasonable but unsuspecting and relying in-
dividual - would fall within clause (3).
Textual analysis of this part of the rule is particularly
difficult because "the courts have traditionally refused . . . to
define fraud with specificity. '62 Nevertheless they have arrived
at an interpretation similar to that above by taking the vague
59 Id. § 7.4(2) at 167 n.103.7 citing brief for SEC as amicus curiae, Fischer
v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
60 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
61 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961).
62 3 L. Loss, SEcuarriEs REGULATION 1436 (2d ed. 1961).
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position that "the use of 'fraud' in rule lOb-5 (3) cannot be
interpreted in its narrow common law sense," 63 or that "the
fraud provisions in the SEC acts . . . are not limited to cir-
cumstances which would give rise to a common law action
for deceit. '64 Although proof of common law fraud is not
necessary, there must be allegations of deception to support a
10b-5 action.65 Therefore, a corporation's failure to disclose
material information will qualify as a fraud or deceit under
rule 10b-5 (3) if the nondisclosure operates to deceive the alleg-
edly injured party.
The above analysis indicates that the words of rule lOb-5 (3)
could provide a source of an affirmative duty to disclose mate-
rial facts only when failure to disclose would result in the
deception of a reasonable investor. Such deception arguably
occurs in three types of situations. In situation A, the com-
pany is subject to the timely disclosure policy of one of the
national exchanges or the NASD (see section III concerning
disclosure policies of exchanges). As a result, it is under
a duty to disclose. Silence in the place of such a duty would
certainly amount to the deception66 of an investor who rea-
sonably expected the corporation to adhere to the obliga-
tions incurred in the listing agreement. 67 Situation B involves
the contention that a corporation's continued silence since its
last public announcement may have reasonably led an investor
to believe that nothing had changed in the interim. If in fact
the corporation had experienced a major discovery but the
shareholder had sold his stock in reliance on the corporation's
silence indicating no change from its already declining position,
the shareholder in situation B would have been deceived by
the corporation's failure to disclose and would have a claim
within the literal meaning of rule 10b-5(3). Situation C con-
cerns a corporation which has pursued a policy of immediate
disclosure of all material events. It would be reasonable for an
investor to rely on the corporation's continuing such a policy
63 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), rehearing denied,
404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
64 3 L. Loss, supra note 62. The statement is made in indicating the general
position of the courts on the matter. Often cited cases, in addition to
Texas Gulf Sulphur, include Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir.
1965), and Ell-is v. Carter, 291 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1962).
65 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Entel v. Allen, 270 F.
Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25
(D) Md. 1965).
66 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (4th ed. 1971).
67Even this duty to disclose is subject to an exception based on the rea-
sonable business judgment of the corporate decisionmakers.
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of timely disclosure. If the corporation violated this policy
and failed to disclose a major occurrence, and if the investor
purchased or sold the corporation's stock to his detriment by
relying on the traditional disclosure policy so as to conclude
that the company's prospects had not changed, then he would
be able to claim deception in an action against the corporation
for failure to disclose.
The key difference among these three situations is the per-
suasiveness of the allegation that the investor acted reasonably
in being deceived, for it is necessary to establish a causal
relationship between the lack of disclosure and the injury
suffered, 68 and in order to do so, the plaintiff must show that
he was reasonable in relying upon the corporation's silence:
[T]he duty to speak which is implicit in Rule [X-] 10B-5 arises
in those circumstances . . . where there is a justifiable expect-
ancy of disclosure or reliance upon the superior knowledge of
another .... 69
Of the three situations, the strongest for arguing that the
corporation's failure to disclose violated clause (3) is situation
A, which involves a company whose stock is listed on one of
the two major exchanges. As indicated above, pursuant to its
listing agreement, the company in situation A is under an
obligation to make timely and adequate disclosure of all mate-
rial information. 70 An investor who is aware of this obligation
is certainly acting reasonably in relying on his expectation
that the company will adhere to it. Silence on the part of
one who has a duty to speak is very close to common law
deception.
71
Situation C, in which the investor relied on the corpora-
tion's silence as an indication of "no change" because of the
company's policy of making immediate public disclosure, is not
quite as strong a case because the corporation had no explicit
obligation to disclose. Nevertheless, given that the corporation
had always disclosed material information immediately, and
that all recent disclosures had been consistent with a future
trend in one direction, then the corporation's failure to disclose
material information which indicated a modification of this
trend could be held to be "deception" in violation of rule
10b-5(3). Of course this holding under situation C could be
68 Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Barnett v. Ana-
conda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
69 Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d
685 (6th Cir. 1960).
70 This discussion assumes that the "business judgment" exception is not
applicable.
71 W. PRossER, supra note 66.
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valid only if an investor had relied on the silence - in con-
junction with the past disclosure policy- to indicate no change
in the recent trend.
Situation B presents the weakest of the three arguments.
Yet it may still have a chance for vindication under clause (3)
because the investor can claim that his deception resulted from
the corporation's failure to inform him of material information
which was inconsistent with the general impression resulting
from earlier disclosures. But the argument is weakened sig-
nificantly by the contention that a reasonable investor in situa-
tion B would not have been deceived by the corporation's
silence, since there was no reason to think that the corpora-
tion would immediately disclose any material information.
The difficulty in finding a violation of rule lOb-5 (3) under
situation B emphasizes the problem of applying 10b-5 (3) to the
general hypothetical posed in this article. The strongest argu-
ment in favor of applying rule lOb-5 (3) to situation B is that
the investor was deceived. As a result he could attempt to sue
for deception because the nondisclosure involved information
indicating a change in the corporation's business fortunes. Yet
all undisclosed material information does not involve a change
in the company's business, and therefore situation B cannot be
applied to the general question of affirmative disclosure. In
fact, the material information withheld might be consistent
with the business trends indicated in the company's most recent
disclosures. In this situation, the above analysis indicates that
the plaintiff must show that his deception resulted from rea-
sonable reliance on the corporation's silence. But absent a
specific obligation such as a stock exchange listing agreement
or a definite company policy to make immediate disclosure, a
reasonable investor would not rely on a public corporation to
disclose all material facts at once. The corporation's silence
regarding material facts cannot constitute deception unless a
reasonable investor could expect disclosure of such facts.
Absent required periodic reports and special factors similar to
those noted, there is no reason to expect that the corporation
will disclose.72 Thus, under these circumstances, a reasonable
investor would not rely on the corporation's silence.
From a relatively strict construction of the words of
72If there were corporate trading or insider trading of which the non-
trading top executives were aware, then the investor could reasonably
expect the corporation to disclose the material facts. The application of
rule lOb-5 to instances when those trading have unequal information
or to other situations in which the nondisclosing party takes unfair ad-
vantage is not discussed because of its exclusion from the question at
hand.
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clause (3), one must conclude that corporate silence does not
"operate as a fraud or deceit" in the general case of a material
nondisclosure. This conclusion renders the words of clauses (1)
and (3) inapplicable to the situation posed.
4. Rule 10b-5, Clause (2)
Clause (2) appears to be more conducive to a literal inter-
pretation because the terms do not have common law connota-
tions such as those which cause so many problems with clauses
(1) and (3) .73 The first phrase of clause (2), "to make any
untrue statement of a material fact" does not apply to the
general situation posed because in a situation of nondisclosure
there is no statement made. However, the alternative conduct
proscribed by clause (2)74 requires further analysis.
A corporation's failure to disclose material information cer-
tainly qualifies as an omission to state a material fact. The real
question of the applicability of clause (2) to a corporation's
failure to disclose is whether such omission is "necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading . . .,75
If as in the situation presented the corporation said absolutely
nothing, then there were no statements made and clause (2)
- by its very words - is inapplicable. Indeed, there is sub-
stantial authority to the effect that clause (2) cannot apply
to a complete failure to disclose because there has been no
statement made.
76
Yet even on their face, the words of clause (2) leave some
question about their applicability to corporate silence in re-
sponse to a material occurrence. The clause proscribes omis-
sions of material facts which, if disclosed, would prevent "the
statements made" from being misleading. There is no indica-
tion of the time period involved during which an omission to
state a material fact must be coupled with a misleading "state-
ment made" in order to constitute a violation of clause (2).
Unless the omission and the statement made pertain to the
same specific transaction, delineation of such a time period
would be extremely difficult. This is because a failure
73 The term "material" has been assumed for the purposes of this paper.
See INTRODUCTION supra.
74 "[T]o omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading .... " 17 C.F.R. § 240 lOb-5 (1972).
75 Id.
76 Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 767 (D. Colo.
1964) ; Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. '1962).




to disclose often cannot be pinpointed to have occurred
at any particular time. Of course if the omission and the
statement made involve facts concerning the same trans-
action, then the omission actually occurred when the statement
was made. But if a corporation becomes aware of favorable
material information (such as an important mineral strike)
one week, and aware of specifically unrelated unfavorable mate-
rial information (such as a foreign government's intention to
expropriate the company's valuable mine in that country) the
next week, then its disclosure of the latter and silence concern-
ing the former raise certain questions.
Presumably an investor could prove that it was very mis-
leading for the company to disclose the intended expropriation
without disclosing the discovery of the previous week. If this
is true, then the corporation could be liable for violating rule
lOb-5 (2) because disclosure of the mineral discovery was neces-
sary in order to make the announcement of the intended expro-
priation not misleading insofar as the company's expectations
for the future are concerned. According to this construction
of clause (2), a corporation can be found within the proscribed
conduct if it has failed to disclose material information at the
time at which it discloses other material information having
inconsistent implications. The principal question regarding
the acceptability of this interpretation is whether the courts
will allow a claim in which the omitted material fact and the
statement made do not pertain to the same specific transaction
or information. At this point, there is no such indication.
Nevertheless, in a release dated October 15, 1970, the SEC indi-
cated its intention to pursue such a holding.
77
A more appropriate situation for applying rule lOb-5 (2) to
corporate silence concerns the relation between timely dis-
closure and the reporting requirements. A corporation's quart-
erly report (form 10-Q) requires relatively little data, and is
concerned mainly with revenue, income, per-share earnings, etc.
The figures to be presented in this report could show a signifi-
cant downtrend, but at the time of disclosure of the report there
could be material undisclosed information existing which is so
favorable to the company that the current operating figures on
the form 10-Q are misleading. Assuming that this material in-
77 "Corporate releases which disclose personnel changes, the receipt of new
contracts, orders and other favorable developments but do not even sug-
gest existing adverse corporate developments do not serve the public
needs and may violate the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934." Securities Act Release No. 5092, Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 8995, Investment Company Act Release No. 6209
(Oct. 15, 1970).
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formation does not fit within one of the mandatory categories
of the form 8-K, then the corporation need not disclose it. This
situation also would seem to fit the words of clause (2) because
the statements made on the form 10-Q certainly are misleading
unless the more recent information is disclosed.
Even if the above arguments are accepted, the words of
rule lOb-5 (2) still cannot be said to apply to the general case of
a corporation's failure to disclose material information. They
have merely been found to apply to special fact situations,
similar to those mentioned above.
5. Summary of Textual Analysis of Rule lOb-5
In summation, a literal interpretation of rule lOb-5 leads
to the conclusion that the rule lacks the substance to provide
an adequate basis for a general corporate duty to disclose mate-
rial information relevant to its operations, except in the case
of the special fact situations enumerated earlier within this
section. Clause (2) would impose such a duty only during
those periods in which the corporation might be making other
public statements and in which full disclosure would be neces-
sary to avoid misleading impressions upon reasonable investors.
A literal interpretation of clause (3) would impose such a duty
only if an investor reasonably could expect such disclosure and
if, in acting under such expectation, he was misled to his
detriment. Nevertheless, as indicated in the following section,
the courts thus far do not seem to have been strictly inhibited
by rigorous interpretations of rule lOb-5,78 and it is in such
court decisions that a stronger basis for an affirmative duty
of disclosure must lie.
B. Rule 10b-5: Judicial Holdings and Rationale
The literal interpretation suggests that the words of rule
lOb-5 do not provide an adequate basis for imposing an affirma-
tive obligation of corporate disclosure of material information
when there is no insider or corporate trading. At this point,
one should look to the case law to determine whether the
courts have utilized the "flexibility" prescribed by the Su-
preme Court for construing anti-fraud securities legislation.
The SEC suit against Texas Gulf Sulphur Company is an
excellent place to begin.7 9 In this factual situation, the com-
78 "Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed
like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding
frauds,' [footnote omitted] not technically and restrictively, but flexibly
to effectuate its remedial purposes." SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
79 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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pany had begun drilling for minerals at a Canadian site in
November 1963. After 5 days, drilling was suspended to ascer-
tain results of a chemical assay. The results of this assay per-
suaded the company to purchase or secure options on the land
without any further drilling. On March 31, 1964, the drilling
resumed.80 By April 11, rumors concerning the magnitude of
the strike were circulating, and the following day the company
issued a press release to discount the rumors. The Commis-
sion's suit claimed that the company had violated rule lOb-5
because the press release created a misleading and deceptive
picture of the drilling progress as of the date of its issuance.
The Commission claimed that the company had favorable facts
which should have been disclosed in the release. In an en banc
opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that if the
press release were found to be misleading, then its issuance by
the corporation constituted a violation of rule lOb-5. 1
In applying Texas Gulf Sulphur to the question of affirma-
tive disclosure, one must remember that in Texas Gulf Sulphur
the corporation was not held liable for the failure to disclose
its discovery, but rather for the misleading nature of its state-
ments. The court held that once a corporation decides to speak,
only then must it be responsible for the truth and accuracy of
its disclosures. 8 2 The thrust was not toward an affirmative duty
to disclose. Indeed, in a footnote to the opinion, Judge Water-
man stated:
We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed immedi-
ately; the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judg-
ment of the corporate officers entrusted with the management
of the corporation within the affirmative disclosure require-
ments promulgated by the exchanges and by the SEC.83
Moreover, the cases indicate that in order for nondisclosure
to constitute a violation of rule lOb-5, there must also be evi-
dence of manipulation,8 4 disregard of a duty to speak created
80 1n the interim, corporate insiders had been purchasing shares and calls
on the corporation's stock, and the SEC suit also concerned this insider
trading. However, insider trading is outside the topic of this paper and
this aspect of any of the cases will only be mentioned where central
to that portion of the court's holding or reasoning cited.
81 401 F.2d at 863. Upon remand the District Court found that the release
was misleading; therefore the company had violated rule 10b-5. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
82401 F.2d at 861-62. But see Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90, 110 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), rehearing
denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
83 401 F.2d at 850 n.12. Although this statement explicitly denies an obli-
gation of affirmative disclosure, its mention of the exchanges and the
SEC does allow for inferences to the contrary. See Section III, B, infra.
84 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42 (D. Colo. 1970); Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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by a special relationship,8 5 or some other form of deception or
unfair behavior through which the undisclosed information was
taken advantage of.86 Absent such special facts, there are no
cases holding that a corporation has a general affirmative
obligation to disclose material information. In fact, in Wessel v.
Buhler,87 the Ninth Circuit seemed to rule out such a possibility.
Therein the complaint alleged that an independent auditor, by
failing to disclose his knowledge of a corporation's deficient fi-
nancial records, had aided and abetted the corporation in violating
rule 10b-5. The court replied that "[w] e find nothing in rule
10b-5 that purports to impose liability on anyone whose conduct
consists solely of inaction."8 Nevertheless, Wessel should not
influence determination of a corporation's affirmative duty to
disclose for the following reasons: first, the suit was not against
the corporation, but was against a remote agent who had no
relation to the public; secondly, as indicated in the textual
analysis, if failure to disclose is to be covered by clause (2)
or clause (3) then such nondisclosure cannot be considered to
consist solely of inaction - it will need to be of a mis-
leading or deceptive nature; finally, the holding in Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. directly contradicted
Wessel.89
Despite the above indications, the issue is not at all settled.
There are a least four recent cases which have mentioned, but
have expressly left unanswered, the question of whether a
corporation has an affirmative duty to disclose.90 Furthermore
there is a considerable amount of judicial language implying
the possibility of such a duty. In Judge Waterman's Texas Gulf
Sulphur opinion, there are several phrases which imply an
objective of full disclosure: a clause criticizing "the hiding and
secreting of important information;" an indication that a public
85 See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir. 1969); Rothschild v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D.
Ill. 1971); Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
86 See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967);
Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
87437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
88 Id. at 283.
89 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966). The district court's holding that silence and inaction might vio-
late rule 10b-5 as aiding or abetting was noted approvingly by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in deciding the appeal of the case
on its merits. However, such approval was only dictum. Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
90 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 99 (10th Cir. 1971);
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 783 n.1 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 879 (1965); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp.
548, 562 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 90 (1971); Astor v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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corporation should not have a general "right to secrecy;" the
stated objective that the markets should be "indices of real
value." 91 In addition, in the earlier-quoted footnote, Judge
Waterman indicated that the court would abide by the dis-
closure requirements of the exchanges.92 In fact, by referring
to the corporate purpose served by the nondisclosure as a
justification for the nondisclosure, the court strengthened the
inference that it considered the timely disclosure policy of the
New York Stock Exchange to be applicable.' 3 If so, Texas Gulf
Sulphur can be said to require affirmative disclosure according
to the rules of the exchange upon which a company's secur-
ities are listed. Nevertheless, even assuming this interpreta-
tion the case could not be said to apply an affirmative dis-
closure obligation to unlisted companies.
In a successful suit by former shareholders against Texas
Gulf Sulphur for damages resulting from reliance on the April
12 press release, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the following:
[T]he duty to disclose facts when they become material has
not been altered by this decision . . [W]hen the material
information is available and ripe for publication, the difficulties
inherent in formulating a release cannot overbear the accuracy
of the statements contained therein.
94
Although the court does not define "available and ripe," the
context from which the above quote is taken is conducive to the
inference of an affirmative duty of disclosure.
Another judicial statement implying an affirmative duty
to disclose was made by the Supreme Court when it asserted
that a fundamental purpose of the Act was "to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor."95
Notwithstanding the above, there is also some judicial
language which implies that a corporation may withhold mate-
rial information as long as no one is taking advantage of it.
91 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1968).
Nevertheless, when considered in context it is difficult to argue that
these phrases are meant to apply to anything other than misrepresenta-
tions.
92 "We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed immediately;
the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the
corporate officers entrusted with the management of the corporation
within the affirmative disclosure requirements promulgated by the ex-
changes and by the SEC." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968).
93The New York Stock Exchange policy of timely and adequate dis-
closure allows withholding material information in order to further a
proper corporate purpose.
4Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 100 (10th Cir. 1971).
95 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
Also quoted in Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970).
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A prime source is Judge Waterman's Texas Gulf Sulphur
opinion:
Thus anyone in possession of material inside information must
either disclose it to the investing public . . . or [if] he chooses
not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the
securities concerned .... 96
Clearly, if the insider may "choose" not to disclose, then there
could not be a corporate duty of affirmative disclosure.
In a Second Circuit opinion by Judge Friendly, the court
stated that a corporation has no duty to correct rumors started
by others:
While a company may choose to correct a misstatement in the
press not attributable to it . . . we find nothing in the securities
legislation requiring it to do so.9
7
The implication here is that if a corporation is not required to
correct a rumor concerning material information, then it would
not be required- under the same legislation - to affirmatively
disclose material information.
Thus the existing judicial precedents under rule 10b-5 do
not impose a corporate duty of affirmative disclosure, yet they
do not deny it. Although there is judicial language which might
imply such a duty, there is also language which implies the
contrary. The situation is ambiguous. In search of classifica-
tion, one can refer to the actual policy and reasoning pursued
by the courts in individual rule 10b-5 cases. There are two
lines of rule lOb-5 violations which are particularly relevant:
(1) violations for a misleading corporate statement in the
absence of trading by the corporation and its insiders, (2) vio-
lations for nondisclosure of later discovered facts which render
previously made statements false. The analysis which follows
each issue includes a discussion of its relevance to the estab-
lishment of an affirmative duty of disclosure.
1. Corporate Liability for a Misleading Statement in the
Absence of Trading by Insiders
In its en banc Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion,9s the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals erased any remaining doubt that a corpo-
ration (or individuals) could violate rule lOb-5 although not
engaging in related securities transactions or otherwise acting
96 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)
(emphasis added).
97 Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
949 (2d Cir. 1969).
98 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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with wrongful motives.9 9 The court reasoned that insofar as
the congressional purpose of investor protection is concerned,
its holding- which rendered insider trading and ulterior mo-
tives unnecessary - was consistent because the investing pub-
lic may be harmed just as much by a statement whose inac-
curacies are caused by negligence as by a statement whose
inaccuracies are created intentionally in furtherance of a
wrongful purpose. Secondly, the possibility of wrongful pur-
pose is not eliminated merely because there has been no insider
trading. The misleading statement could have failed to affect
the market sufficiently to encourage insider trading, or the
purpose could have been something other than beneficial trad-
ing. Therefore, finding a violation for misleading statements
regardless of any evidence of wrongful intent fulfills the
primary purpose of investor protection without necessarily
punishing innocent intentions.
Nevertheless, the issue was not completely settled either
by the Second Circuit's opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur or by
the district court's actual finding upon remand that a rule
lOb-5 violation did exist, based upon the misleading nature of
the press release, the lack of due diligence by the issuers of
the statement, and the use of due care by the injured in-
vestors.100 Because this case involved merely an injunctive
action by the Commission, it still had to be determined whether
a private action for damages could be sustained by alleging
that a company had made a misleading statement without
alleging the existence of any corporate or insider trading.
Two months after the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the Second
Circuit decided Heit v. Weitzen,'0 ' applying the same Texas
Gulf Sulphur reasoning to find a private right of action for
damages for a misleading statement in the absence of insider
trading under rule 10b-5. In Heit, the corporate defendant failed
to disclose that a substantial amount of its income for the 1964
fiscal year was derived from various overcharges on government
contracts. The court held that plaintiffs who purchased securi-
ties of the defendant corporation in reliance on the misleading
information in the press release were entitled to relief under
rule lOb-5 despite the lack of any evidence of corporate or
insider trading.
99 "There is no indication that Congress intended that the corporations or
persons responsible for the issuance of a misleading statement would
not violate the section unless they engaged in related securities trans-
actions or otherwise acted with wrongful motives." Id. at 860.
100 SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
101 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Although Heit v. Weitzen establishes a private right of
action for a misleading statement in the absence of trading by
the issuer of the statement, the facts do not necessarily justify
a private right of action as broad as the injunctive right estab-
lished in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Because the corporate defend-
ant in Heit was trying to conceal the source of its profits from
government officials, the misleading statements may be said
to have been motivated by a wrongful purpose. Therefore, the
case can be distinguished from a holding that insider trading
or other wrongful motives are not necessary for a violation
of rule 10b-5 (2). Heit v. Weitzen thus establishes that a viola-
tion of rule 10b-5 (2) in private suits can be found in the
absence of insider trading,10 2 but, in that the corporation was
aware of the statement's misleading nature, it cannot be said
that this case negates the possibility of such a violation where
no wrongful purpose exists.
Thus, although the Texas Gulf Sulphur and Heit cases may
stand for the principle that a violation of rule 10b-5 (2) can
occur by a corporation not trading in its securities and not
otherwise acting for wrongful puposes, it cannot be said
whether the same factors are sufficient to sustain a private suit
for damages. Furthermore, given the fact that a corporation
need not be trading in its own securities in order to violate
rule 10b-5 through a material misstatement, the courts are
not in agreement as to what - if any - degree of knowledge
or intent (i.e. wrongful purpose) on the part of the corporation
is necessary to sustain a private suit for damages.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion held that proof of negli-
gence in issuing a misstatement was sufficient to sustain an
action for injunctive relief under rule 10b-5 (2), but declined to
decide whether mere negligence was sufficient in a private suit
for damages. 10 3 The Heit court held that an allegation of actual
knowledge of the falsity was a sufficient pleading to sustain
the action even if a strict scienter test were ultimately
applied.10 4 In its 1969 Globus decision, the Second Circuit again
indicated that something more than negligence, although less
than an actual intent to mislead was necessary in a private suit
for damages:
102Id.; Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
103 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968). In fact,
a majority of the court indicated that they would require some sort of
scienter in a private suit for damages. See concurring opinion of Judge
Friendly joined by Judges Kaufman and Anderson, 401 F.2d at 864; and
dissenting opinion of Judge Moore, joined by Chief Judge Lumbard, 401
F.2d at 870.
104 402 F.2d at 914.
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[The jury must conclude that defendants] knew the statement
was misleading or knew of the existence of facts, which if dis-
closed, would have shown it to be misleading.
1 05
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit has stated explicitly that
mere negligence is enough for lOb-5 liability in a private suit
against the maker of a misleading statement.10 6
Similarly, in a suit by former shareholders of Texas Gulf
Sulphur claiming that the April 12, 1964, press release violated
rule lOb-5 because of its allegedly misleading nature,'0 7 the
Tenth Circuit seems to be adopting the negligence standard as
well. In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the court held that
the corporate defendant would prevail only if it sustained the
burden of proving that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the
corporation could not have known that the statement included
a misrepresentation or an omission.
08
It is thus uncertain to what degree the corporate defendant
must intend or know of the misleading nature of its statements
in order to be liable in a private suit for damages under rule
lOb-5(2). Nevertheless, the reasoning of the Second Circuit has
prevailed: the application of rule lOb-5(2) to misleading state-
ments does not depend upon contemporaneous trading by the
corporation and its insiders nor does it depend upon the exist-
ence of an ulterior motive in the issuance of a misleading press
release.
In holding that rule lOb-5 can be violated by issuing a mis-
leading statement, despite the violator's failure to take advan-
tage of his statement, the courts have moved away from some
of the traditional premises identified with rule lOb-5. Former
SEC Chairman Cary had defined the duty of disclosure in his
In re Cady, Roberts & Co. opinion.1 9 In Cary's view it was not
until an insider attempted to take advantage of the information
that a violation of rule 10b-5 occurred. This rationale had con-
tinued and was repeated as recently as the original district court
proceeding against Texas Gulf Sulphur.1 0
105 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290 (2d Cir. 1969).
106 City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir.
1970).
107 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
108 Id. at 102. The Mitchell court cites City National Bank v. Vanderboom,
422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970) and Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1961), for holding that scienter is not required to maintain a private
10b-5 damage action.
109 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
110 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In
fact, on the basis of the lack of any attempt by the corporate defendant
to take advantage of the misleading press release, Judge Bonsal held
that the company had not violated rule 10b-5, 258 F. Supp. at 294. As
noted in the text, the Second Circuit reversed this issue. 401 F.2d at
860-62.
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A second premise rendered inconsistent by the "taking
advantage is not necessary" holding was set forth in a 1951
opinion of the Delaware Federal District Court, Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., when the court asserted that equalization of
bargaining position was the goal of rule lOb-5.11' Of course,
this reasoning was modified in order to apply the expansion of
rule 10b-5 to impersonal transactions on open-market exchanges,
and a modified version was restated in the Second Circuit
opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur:
The core of Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congres-
sional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the
rewards of participation in securities transactions . . . that all
members of the investing public should be subject to identical
market risks .... The insiders here were not trading on an
equal footing with the outside investors.1 12
The contention here is not that such equal access to mate-
rial information is no longer a goal of rule 10b-5, but rather
that by holding that taking advantage of material inside in-
formation is not necessary for a violation of rule 10b-5, the
courts are recognizing policy objectives in addition to the two
stated in Cady, Roberts and in Speed. If a corporation is held
to have violated rule 10b-5 by issuing a misleading press release
of which the company did not attempt to take advantage, then,
(1) the courts are no longer saying that it is the use of the
material information which constitutes a violation of rule
lOb-5, 1 3 and (2) enforcement of rule 10b-5 involves objectives
other than equal access to material information, because in the
case of the false financial statements in Heit (and theoretically
in the case of the misleading press release in Texas Gulf Sul-
phur) all of those trading had equal access to the false informa-
tion and no access to the correct information: In other words,
the courts are pursuing the objective that the investing public
be accurately informed.
As indicated above, some courts have pursued an implicit
policy that investors be accurately informed. Other courts,
however, have made this policy explicit. In fact, several courts
have stated unequivocally that the congressional policy was,
and that the judicial policy is, to assure investors the continu-
ous receipt of accurate information. In his Texas Gulf Sulphur
opinion, Judge Waterman indicates that the dominant purpose
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is the promotion of free
M' Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
112 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
11 Cases cited notes 109 & 110 supra, in addition to Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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and open securities markets. He then underscores the im-
portance of a policy oriented toward accurate information by
quoting from a house committee report on the bill which even-
tually became the 1934 Act:114 "There cannot be honest mar-
kets without honest publicity." Later in the opinion, Judge
Waterman repeats what he considers to be the overriding con-
cern in cases involving inaccurate corporate publicity:
Of even greater relevance to the Congressional purpose of
investor protection is the fact that the investing public may be
injured as much by one's misleading statement containing inac-
curacies caused by negligence as by a misleading statement
published intentionally to further a wrongful purpose. 115
If Judge Waterman had considered the sole policy of rule
10b-5 to be equality among investors, then his statement quoted
above would have been inappropriate.
Given the fact that the courts, under rule 10b-5, are holding
companies responsible for the accuracy of the information they
issue even when they are not taking advantage of its inaccu-
racy, the question arises whether this policy includes holding
these companies responsible for complete disclosure of all mate-
rial information. In other words, does a policy which requires
that all publicity be accurate and not misleading in effect re-
quire that the publicity be complete? Can a corporation's public
statements be totally accurate and not misleading if there is
material information which the corporation has not stated or
will not state when it becomes known? One cannot say
that a corporation's public statements are accurate unless such
statements include all material information available to the
corporation.
This position has been corroborated by judicial pronounce-
ments which proclaim that the congressional purpose of in-
vestor protection can only be obtained by pursuing accurate
and complete disclosure for the investing public. One of the
most direct statements of this argument was made by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in a 1970 opinion:
The [Securities Exchange] Act was designed to eliminate decep-
tive and unfair practices in security trading and to protect the
public from inaccurate, incomplete and misleading information. 116
The court then proceeded to explain that, by protecting the
public from "inaccurate, incomplete and misleading informa-
114 401 F.2d at 858.
115 Id. at 860.
116 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970).
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tion," the investing public is given the opportunity "to make
knowing and intelligent decisions" in trading securities.117
An equally recent opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals also indicates that disclosures must be complete as well
as accurate in order to carry out the purposes of both the
1934 Act and rule lOb-5:
Congress meant to afford investors a reasonable opportunity to
make knowing, intelligent decisions regarding their purchases
and sales of securities . . . and the loss resulting in connection
with purchases and sales made without benefit of such an op-
portunity is the type of injury section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
seek to prevent.'1 8
Thus, the courts seem to be arriving at the conclusion that
responsibility for the accuracy of disclosures, (regardless of the
motives for issuing them) entails responsibility for the com-
pleteness of disclosures. When considered in regard to an in-
vestor's attempt to make a rational investment decision, this
conclusion becomes inevitable. An investor who lacks knowl-
edge of some undisclosed material information is theoretically
no more able to make a rational investment decision than one
possessing information which is somewhat untrue. Lack of
knowledge of such facts as a recently executed lucrative con-
tract or a rich mineral strike may leave the investor just as
uninformed as if he had received an understatement of the
company's earnings. In either case he possesses inaccurate in-
formation. Therefore, if the courts desire to protect investors
from inaccurate information, they should require corporations
to disclose all material information.
2. Liability for Failure to Disclose Information which
Renders Previous Statements False
In Fischer v. Kletz,119 a New York federal district court
held that a company's independent auditors could be liable to
open-market investors under rule 10b-5 for a failure to disclose
newly acquired information that the company's published finan-
cial statements, certified by defendants, were false. The help-
fulness of the holding in finding support for the affirmative
duty of disclosure described above is limited by the court's fail-
ure to mention which clause of the rule would be applicable.
Such a lumping of the clauses of rule 10b-5 is not unusual.
120
117 Id.
118 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970).
119 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
120 Most of the earlier rule lOb-5 cases are not concerned with distinguish-
ing the clauses. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 56, § 2.6(3); Note, supra
note 57, at 826-27. Although many of the more recent cases do refer
to a particular clause or clauses, in the opinion of the author, this is
still not a predominant practice.
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The amicus curiae brief filed by the SEC in Fischer v.
Kletz indicates the Commission's view that the accountants'
failure to disclose constituted a violation of clause (3):
Failure by an accountant to disclose that financial statements
of a company which it has certified are false when it has be-
come aware of that fact is, under Rule lOb-5 (3), an act or course
of business which operates as a fraud on persons in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities of that company.121
If the court agreed with the Commission and was thinking of
clause (3) in upholding the action based on the accountants'
failure to disclose, its reasoning would be consistent with that
expressed in Cochran v. Channing:
Fraud may be accomplished by false statements, a failure to
correct a misleading impression by statements already made or
... by not stating anything at all when there is a duty to come
forward and speak.
122
The interesting question which emerges from this language is
why the nondisclosure operates as a fraud under rule 10b-5 (3):
Is it because the accountants failed to corrrect the misleading
impression made by the original financial statements or be-
cause, as certified public accountants, they had a special duty
of disclosure to the public?
The answer should not be clear and simple. It probably
involves a combination of the facts that (a) the defendants'
certification of financial statements is for investor protection
and (b) their earlier certification had become unwarranted.
Although the case emphasizes the special duty of an independent
auditor to the public, such emphasis was necessary in order to
distinguish the case from all available precedent which at that
time indicated that a violation of rule lOb-5 could not occur
unless the misleading or undisclosed information were some-
how used to benefit the defendant. 12 3  Nevertheless, the im-
portant point is that the court found a violation of rule 10b-5
by the accountants' failure to disclose newly acquired informa-
tion that the earlier statements were false. The court, and the
SEC, are saying that an investor can be defrauded by this fail-
ure to disclose. But the "fraud" does not involve any "cheat-
121 Brief for SEC as amicus curiae, Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) quoted in 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW § 7.4(2)
n.103.3 (1968).
122 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
123 Even in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the lower court had followed
precedent by saying that there could be no violation of rule lOb-5 for
issuing a misleading press release unless those responsible, including
the corporation, somehow took advantage. SEC v. Texas Gulf ,Sulphur
Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals later reversed Judge Bonsal on this issue. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir. 1968).
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ing" or unfair advantage taken by the accountants -the court
recognizes that they are not receiving any gain. Nor does the
fraud involve unfairness between any two transacting or negoti-
ating parties. Rather, the court is saying that the nondisclosure
operates as a fraud upon the public because they are dealing
with inaccurate, although not unequal, information.
The above reasoning is prescribed as a basis for holding a
corporation liable for failure to disclose material information
in the absence of corporate and insider trading. In both situa-
tions, nondisclosure does not confer any unfair advantages to
any parties. In both situations, the fraud involved is the mis-
leading nature of the information possessed by the public.
This argument-that nondisclosure results in the same use
of misleading information by the investing public as does false
disclosure- parallels the argument made in the previous sec-
tion concerning misleading statements.
However, the Fischer case represents the use of clause (3)
and therefore the taking of one additional step by the courts.
The Fischer court recognized that nondisclosure itself can oper-
ate as a fraud even when no one is taking advantage of the
fraud.124 The Texas Gulf Sulfur and Heit cases stated the same
conclusion but with respect to misleading statements rather than
to nondisclosures.
Even if the Fischer case can be said to hold that a non-
disclosure operates as a fraud when no one is taking unfair
advantage, the facts still present two variations from the hy-
pothesized situation. First, the nondisclosure involved correc-
tion of a statement previously made. On this basis one could
argue that the court did not recognize an initial affirmative
duty to disclose, but rather a duty based only upon the former
misleading statement. Although this distinction may be theoretic-
ally accurate, its significance is questionable. In a normal busi-
ness setting, a corporation continually makes certain disclos-
ures.125 When a material event occurs but is not disclosed,
earlier statements made by the corporation become misleading
to the extent that they are relied upon by investors. Thus, im-
posing an affirmative obligation to disclose material information
in the hypothesized setting serves to avoid misleading impres-
124 As stated earlier, this assumes that the court was looking to clause (3).
There is the remote possibility that the Fischer court was concerned
with clause (2). However, application of clause (2) would necessitate
an argument that there is absolute liability for a false statement even
though no one has taken unfair advantage of it. Thus denial of even
the defense of due diligence seems extremely unlikely, particularly at
the time of the Fischer decision.
125 See Sections I & II supra concerning corporate reporting requirements.
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sions created by previous disclosures just as does the imposition
of a duty to correct previous statements known to be false. The
only difference is that in the former situation, the subsequent
disclosure might not pertain to the specific topics dealt with
in the original disclosure.
The second distinguishing factor in the Fischer case is the
fact that the nondisclosing party was an independent certified
public accountant whose task was to certify the financial state-
ments for the protection of public investors. It might be argued
that there is a unique relationship between an independent au-
ditor and the public which might impose a "duty to come for-
ward and speak. '126 Indeed, in Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co.,
12 7
the court cited Fischer in emphasizing the special position of an
independent auditor. But the court's purpose in holding that
"[t]he issuance of a financial statement by an independent
auditing firm is not the same as the issuing of a press release"'
128
was to establish that independent auditors, as opposed to other
corporate insiders, could be held liable for misstatements which
they had caused even if they did not benefit from them. As
indicated earlier, after the appellate decisions in Texas Gulf
Sulphur and Heit, such a showing was no longer necessary. In
fact, the Heit court, with essentially the same facts as the
Drake court, found a cause of action to exist under rule lOb-5
without an allegation of a special relationship between an inde-
pendent auditor and the public.
129
Even if one includes Fischer within the "duty to come
forward and speak" category, a corporation's duty to disclose
material information should also be included within this same
category. It seems artificial to argue that there is more of a
special relationship between an independent auditor hired by
corporate management and the investing public than there is
between corporate management and the very shareholders by
whom they were elected. A duty arising from this latter rela-
tionship is recognized in SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. 30
In that case, the president of a corporation had issued an ac-
curate press release on February 6. Within 2 weeks, unfavorable
developments rendered the release misleading, but the company
made no announcement of the changed circumstances until May
12. The court's initial reaction was that:
126 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
127 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
128 Id. at 105.
129 Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
130 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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The public had the right to know that negotiations were no
longer concluded . . . [because these] facts . . . would have put
investors on notice that the February 6th release was no longer
worthy of reliance.13'
Speaking of the corporation, the court found that "[i] ts silence
in the face of such knowledge is inexcusable."1 3 2 Although the
corporation was held not to have violated rule lOb-5 because
there was no showing that it derived any benefit, the language
of the court makes it clear that such a violation would have
been found under the "no gain is necessary" doctrine which was
subsequently accepted in Texas Gulf Sulphur and Heit. Thus the
Shattuck court found that the corporation's relationship to its
shareholders obliged it to disclose the falsity of previously made
statements. Therefore, although in light of Heit the Fischer hold-
ing does not depend upon the "unique" relation of an indepen-
dent auditor to the shareholders of the corporation,' 33 any argu-
ment supporting the significance of this relationship would have
to acknowledge Shattuck's determination that the relationship
between management and the shareholders is equally special.1
4
Thus once more, the courts are utilizing rule 10b-5 to insure
dissemination of complete and accurate information in order to
enable investors to make intelligent investment decisions. In so
using rule 10b-5, the courts have indicated that failure to dis-
,close material information to the investing public operates as
a fraud upon investors. As expressed above, this policy cannot
be pursued effectively unless companies are compelled to make
timely disclosure of all material information.
C. Position of the SEC
In addition to the holdings and implications of past cases,
the position of the Securities and Exchange Commission is likely
to be an important determinant of whether rule 10b-5 provides
an affirmative obligation to disclose. It is noteworthy that the
Commission did not claim that Texas Gulf Sulphur's failure
to disclose its discovery was itself a violation of rule 10b-5.
Indeed, this has been taken by some to indicate that, at least
in 1966, the Commission felt that a corporation had a right to
withhold material information as long as it was not trading in
131 Id. at 475-76.
132 Id. at 476.
133 Any obligation emanating from the relationship between corporate
management and the corporation's shareholders is immediately ex-
panded to apply to the public. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
913-14 (1961).
134 See also Rothschild v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Ill. 1971),
in which the Court dismissed a 10b-5 action for nondisclosure, but im-
plied that the cause might be valid if defendants occupied a manage-
ment-shareholder relationship with plaintiffs.
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its stock. 135 On the other hand, the publication of two relatively
recent releases indicates that the Commission is taking a more
aggressive stand.
In a 1970 release, the Commission directly stated that cor-
porations should be making "prompt disclosure . . . of material
corporate developments, both favorable and unfavorable" in
order to maintain investor confidence in the securities market.' 36
The statement asserted that a company "has an obligation to
make full and prompt announcements of material facts regard-
ing the company's financial condition" in addition to compliance
with the statutory reporting requirements. In a statement es-
pecially relevant to this article, the Commission asserted the
following:
Not only must material facts affecting the company's operations
be reported; they must also be reported promptly. Corporate
releases which disclose personnel changes, the receipt of new
contracts, orders and other favorable developments but do not
even suggest existing adverse corporate developments do not
serve the public needs and may violate the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... 137
These quotes tend to indicate that the SEC believes that pub-
licly held corporations have an affirmative obligation to make
timely disclosure of material corporate developments and that
failure to do so involves a violation of rule 10b-5. Nevertheless,
the Commission's statement involves somewhat special facts
and is not necessarily applicable to the hypothesized case.
The SEC's position concerning a corporation's affirmative
duty to disclose material information is corroborated by a
subsequent 1971 release concerning mandatory disclosures in
registration for a public offering:
Disclosure of factual information in response to inquiries or
resulting from a duty to make prompt disclosure under the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities acts.., at a time when a regis-
'35 Address by David Ferber, Solicitor, SEC, Before the New York Society
of Security Analysts, Feb. 17, 1966, p. 4-5. (Text furnished on loan
basis by Mr. Ferber's office).
Furthermore, in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,
426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970), the Commission contended in its amicus
brief that neither Bangor Punta nor Piper Corporation was obligated
to announce a material agreement between them as long as there was
no trading by those privy to the information. (Dissenting opinion of
Chief Judge Lumbard, 426 F.2d at 579). The significance of this posi-
tion is difficult to assess because of its self-serving nature for the Com-
mission: The suit claimed that Bangor Punta had violated § 5 of the
1933 Act by disclosing an estimate of the value of the agreement. The
defendant contended that it had an obligation to disclose the material
fact. Such obligation had to be denied in order to support this action
for violation of § 5 of the Securities Act.
136 Securities Act Release No. 5092, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8995, Investment Company Act Release No. 6209 (Oct. 15, 1970).
137 Sources cited note 136 supra.
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tered offering . . . is . .. in process .... should be effected
in a manner which will not unduly influence the proposed
offering.1
3 8
Thus, the SEC appears ready to require affirmative disclosure
by corporations not trading in their stock. At the present time,
however, they have not yet done so. As with the issues in
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Commission will probably wait for
arrival of the right facts and circumstances in order to enhance
its chances of success.
D. Summary of Rule 10b-5 as Source of an Affirmative Duty
In the search for a source to provide an affirmative cor-
porate obligation to disclose, a brief tour through the exten-
sive world of rule 10b-5 leaves one with many possibilities but
no actualities. The words of the rule provide hope, particularly
in certain "special" - but not extraordinary -circumstances.
But under a strict or literal construction, the words require the
following interpretational help from the courts: (1) Can failure
to disclose material information as it becomes available be mis-
leading because it modifies a statement made some time pre-
viously? (2) Is a former shareholder being "reasonable" in
assuming that nondisclosure indicates the absence of any ma-
terial developments?
The cases provide no explicit help. Several courts have
reached, but have not touched, the question of affirmative dis-
closure. The holdings have repeatedly avoided the issue. Never-
theless, the tools are presently available for an ambitious court,
desiring to take advantage of them, to rule on the issue. From
its recent statements, the SEC appears ready -either as a
plaintiff or as an amicus- to argue for affirmative disclosure.
Furthermore, the courts have made policy statements concerning
the legislative objectives of investor protection which seem ra-
tionally to justify an affirmative obligation to disclose. For ex-
ample, judicial pronouncements have focused on the importance
of the following: (a) integrity and honesty in securities mar-
kets, (b) accurate and complete information to investors, (c)
investor confidence in the securities markets, and (d) sufficient
information to make rational and knowledgeable investment
decisions. In addition, most courts agree that the anti-fraud
provisions are to be interpreted flexibly in order to realize the
congressional purpose of investor protection.
Finally, and most importantly, among the tools available
are the rationale and policy objectives expressed by the courts
138 Securities Act Release No. 5180 (Aug. 16, 1971).
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in reaching past decisions. The policy goal of protecting investors
from misleading statements or from failure to disclose the sub-
sequently discovered falsity of a previously issued statement
cannot be attained without protecting the investor from material
nondisclosures. The effect of each is the same.
In conclusion, under present law rule lOb-5 does not impose
a general affirmative obligation for a corporation to disclose
material information. Yet, given the words of the rule, the
judicially acknowledged congressional purpose, the posture of
the SEC, and the reasoning and policy behind the existing ju-
dicial precedent, rule lOb-5 provides the tools and material for
formally constructing such an obligation.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AFFIRMATiVE DIscLOsURE
The preceding sections of this article have attempted to
locate authority for imposing an affirmative obligation to dis-
close upon a publicly held corporation. At this point, the focus
shall shift to an examination of the advantages gained and the
practicalities encountered in implementing such an obligation.
A. Advantages Resulting from Affirmative Disclosure
Full and immediate disclosure of material information elim-
inates the possibility that insiders will take unfair advantage
of their proximity to inside information. Not only would timely
disclosure significantly reduce unfair trading by insiders and
their tippers, but it would also prevent the unfair trading
which is made possible by inevitable leaks of information to
those not even employed by the particular corporation. 139 This
result would increase the opportunity for all traders to have
equal access to material information concerning publicly held
corporations. As a result, the Second Circuit's objective of
"equal access to the rewards of participation in securities trans-
actions" 140 would be greatly enhanced.
'39 This idea was reaffirmed in informal individual interviews held in
April 1972, with two portfolio managers in Boston. In spite of their
different perspectives, they reacted to the idea of affirmative disclosure
with surprising similarity. Each of the portfolio managers felt that the
most important consequence of affirmative disclosure would be the
virtual elimination of insider trading. The two portfolio managers
interviewed had quite different outlooks. One is involved in eliciting
full and nontraditional forms of disclosure from publicly held corpora-
tions. He is particularly concerned with disclosure regarding a corpora-
tion's policy toward minority employment and environmental issues.
He immediately suggested that his views not be regarded as typical
because of his personal commitment to full disclosure. The other port-
folio manager is a more traditional financially oriented analyst. Both
individuals are employed by nationally prominent financial institutions.
Because of his company's very rigid policy, the name of one of the port-
folio managers must be withheld. For the sake of uniformity, the name
of the other will be withheld as well.
140 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1968).
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The current state of the law presents a second advantage
which would result from affirmative disclosure. At the present
time, even in the absence of insider trading, a corporation will
be held responsible for the misleading nature of its statements
once it has decided to speak.1 4 1 But if the corporation decides
not to disclose, it does not risk liability. Under these circum-
stances, a corporation is encouraged to adhere to a policy of
nondisclosure. However, if an affirmative duty of disclosure were
imposed upon the corporation, it would then be forced to speak.
Thus, a steady stream of corporate information would flow
into the securities markets.
A third group of advantages to be gained from full dis-
closure concern those accruing to the investing public. The SEC's
Special Study of Securities Markets reported that "[t]he de-
liberate withholding of news by companies can be as harmful
to investors as the release of inaccurate or overoptimistic
news.' 1 42 Given more timely and complete information, in-
vestors will be able to make more rational and knowledgeable
decisions. They will have more confidence in the securities
markets, and should be better able to compare the value of one
security with that of another. As a result, investors could buy
securities at a more accurate price and would be less prone
to "uneconomic" investments.
Finally, and closely related to the advantages for the in-
vesting public, are the advantages gained by the securities mar-
kets themselves. If a policy of affirmative corporate disclosure
were adopted, the consequence of a continuous and timely
flow of corporate information would help to bolster investor
confidence in the integrity of the securities markets. In all
likelihood, this increased confidence would give rise to a con-
stant or even increased level of investor participation. Increases
in both investor confidence and participation are important
because of the crucial role which the securities markets play
in financing business.
The economy also gains from full disclosure because of
the resulting improvement in the allocative efficiency of the
capital markets.143 With full and timely disclosure, investors
will make more rational investment decisions, and more funds
141 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
142 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY
OF SECuRrrIEs MARKET 92 (1963).
143 Id. at 16. See also Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate




will be channeled into the more efficient and productive com-
panies. However, normal trading between investors (i.e., on the
exchanges or over-the-counter) has no direct effect on the
allocation of capital resources because the companies receive
nothing. But when a company later comes out with an offering
of securities to raise more capital, investors will use the addi-
tional information to determine if this particular issue repre-
sents a more efficient use of their funds. This improved allo-
cation of capital resources represents a long-term gain for the
national economy.
B. Practical Problems of Implementation
Given the above advantages realizable from a corporation's
duty to affirmatively disclose all material information, there
are .definite problems presented by the implementation of such
a duty. The first major problem is determining what should be
disclosed. Corporate management will be forced to make con-
tinual determination of what is material. This is certainly not
a new problem because determinations of materiality have al-
ready been necessary to comply with various provisions of the
securities acts.1 4 4 Yet, because of the existence of an affirma-
tive duty, the number of such determinations will increase.
There is certainly information which an investor might find
to be material at the moment it first appears, but which would
not be considered material if disclosed with a good deal of other
information at the end of a 30-day or 90-day period.
If in doubt concerning what should be disclosed, manage-
ment would tend to "play it safe" by disclosing everything.
This leads to two undesirable consequences. First, the investing
public will be flooded with disclosures. Rather than being able
to use the information most rationally, there is the danger that
they will be confronted with an unmanageable amount and
tend to ignore it altogether. Secondly, by disclosing everything,
directors will become more vulnerable to liability for dis-
closures which are misleading because they were made pre-
maturely.
The problem of what to disclose is real but not overwhelm-
ing. Although there would undoubtedly be more determina-
tions of materiality, after a short time a corporation should
be able to handle them almost mechanically. In general, the
type of information would ordinarily fit into recurring patterns.
Should the public begin to ignore certain kinds of disclosures
144 E.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 12, 17(a), -15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77g(a) (1970);
SEA § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
because of their continual appearance, it would seem that the
test for materiality could be accommodated to exclude those
types of information which a reasonable investor would not
utilize.145 Finally, a careful corporate management could avoid
undue liability for premature disclosure by qualifying its ini-
tial statements with honest indications of the possibility of con-
trary developments.
Related to the problem of materiality, the question arises
as to whether a duty of affirmative disclosure would result in
a flood of litigation overflowing the courts. For example, an
investor who purchased a company's common stock on June 1
might realize a loss by selling the stock on July 8 in the wake
of the company's timely disclosure that its June operations
were subpar. If he later found that the company had taken
some undisclosed action in May, such as firing one of its 25
vice-presidents, it is conceivable that he could sue for failure
to disclose on the basis that he would not have purchased had
he known of the intervening action. If such suits were per-
mitted to prevail, the courts could conceivably be inundated
with them. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the
courts would be able to avoid this problem by a few initially
strict holdings concerning proof of materiality and actual re-
liance. Knowledge of such precedent should be effective in
discouraging further frivolous litigation.
Another major problem area concerns dissemination. As-
suming that all of the proper information is disclosed, how
can it be circulated to everyone equally? Even if it were agreed
that publication in the Wall Street Journal would satisfy the
obligation of equal dissemination, the problem would not be
ultimately solved since any single newspaper cannot be expected
to have room for all such disclosures requested by diverse cor-
porate managements. It is likewise doubtful that the financial
wire services have the capacity to carry all such disclosures.
Notwithstanding the above, it must still be admitted that dis-
semination is a difficult problem for the smaller publicly held
companies even under present disclosure requirements. The fi-
nancial media have space limitations and are not likely to print
news concerning relatively few people or dollars. Yet, an in-
creased number of disclosures would aggravate this problem
considerably.
A suggested solution to the dissemination problem is to
compel a mailing of the disclosure to each shareholder. But this
145 See definition of materiality in INTRODUCTION supra.
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is not only extremely expensive, it also presents problems of
timing and, most objectionably, gives an unfair advantage to
shareholders over nonshareholders. For smaller regional com-
panies, dissemination might be accomplished by publication of
disclosures in newspapers located in areas of stockholder con-
centration. Although there are no entirely satisfactory solu-
tions to the dissemination problem, it must be recognized that
this problem exists under existing disclosure requirements and
is therefore not unique to affirmative disclosure.
Affirmative disclosure entails a third major problem area:
the possible negative effects of disclosure on the corporation's
business or competitive position. The courts have been quick
to recognize the urgency of this problem, and have justified
a company's failure to disclose on the basis of a valuable cor-
porate purpose 146 or competitive reasons147 without having de-
clared nondisclosure by itself to be improper.
If the corporate purpose doctrine or competitive position
theory were allowed to justify nondisclosure in a situation
compelling affirmative disclosure, the latter duty would be
considerably undermined. A corporation desiring not to disclose
something could theoretically find some corporate purpose by
which to justify its silence. The problem of setting standards
for judging the existence of a proper corporate purpose is an
extremely perplexing one. In the end, such standards would
have to place tremendous reliance and pressure upon the courts.
Judicial rejection of a defense of proper corporate purpose would
entail detailed examination of the operations of the business
involved. Furthermore, corporate management would be left
with few objective criteria by which to plan its future dis-
closures. Although there is little doubt that over time the
courts could develop adequate doctrines and standards for
applying the "corporate purpose" exception to affirmative dis-
closure, the difficulties, ambiguities, and numerous litigation
certain to arise represent significant costs in implementing an
affirmative duty to disclose.
In addition to the above advantages and disadvantages re-
sulting from affirmative disclosure, one must also consider what
sanctions to impose upon the corporation for violation of such
a duty. There are numerous issues to be considered in determin-
ing when and why an individual should be able to recover from
a corporation which has not derived any benefit from the im-
146 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968).
147 Doglow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1971).
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proper disclosure.14 But most of these issues are also encoun-
tered in cases of misleading statements made in the absence of
corporate trading and are therefore not unique to the situation
being considered.'4 9
As indicated in the discussion of pertinent case law herein,
the various circuits differ as to whether mere negligence is
sufficient to sustain an action for private damages under rule
10b-5.150 In the Second Circuit, although actual knowledge of
the falsity of a statement is enough to sustain the action,151
something more than mere negligence is required. In the Tenth
Circuit, failure to exercise due care is sufficient for allowing
private damages. 1 52 Therefore, if affirmative disclosure were
required, a private action for damages for failure to disclose
would involve no new problems in the Tenth Circuit. Upon a
showing that the defendant had abrogated his duty to disclose
and that the plaintiff had relied to his detriment, the outcome
would depend upon whether defendant's failure to disclose re-
sulted from a lack of due diligence.
On the other hand, in the Second Circuit, the plaintiff
would have to show that the defendant possessed some degree
of scienter. 1 53 But in a case in which the defendant has been
completely silent and has derived no benefit from this silence,
scienter - even of a minor degree - could be extremely difficult
to prove. In Heit v. Weitzen15 4 the scienter requirement was
fulfilled by defendant's knowledge of the falsity. Analogously
in a suit for nondisclosure, one would have to establish the
defendant's knowledge of the materiality of the information
withheld. In the absence of any statement by defendant regard-
ing this information or of any benefit to defendant for with-
holding it, such knowledge would seem very difficult to prove.
In the Globus case' 55 the court seemed to apply a less
demanding standard. The scienter requirement was satisfied if
defendants were aware of facts which, if disclosed, would have
made the statements in question misleading. Applying this stand-
ard to an abrogation of affirmative disclosure, one would have
148 See, e.g., Note, supra note 57.
149 Other such questions include the huge potential liability and whether
innocent shareholders should have to pay indirectly.
150 Texas Gulf Sulphur held that mere negligence could sustain an action
for injunctive relief.
151 Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
152 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
153 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (2d Cir.
1969).
154 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
155 418 F.2d at 1290.
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to prove that defendants were aware of undisclosed facts which
would be considered material. This standard seems easier to
prove in the case of a nontalking, nondealing corporate defendant
than is the standard in Heit. Nevertheless, it is much more dif-
ficult to prove the state of knowledge possessed by a silent de-
fendant who is making no use of the undisclosed information.
Therefore, in a jurisdiction requiring more than mere neg-
ligence to establish private damages under rule lOb-5, a plain-
tiff's chances of success may be lessened as a result of the
difficulty of proving even a limited degree of scienter. In other
words, if some degree of willfulness is necessary to establish
damages in a suit for failure to disclose, then the vast majority
of such suits may be forced to limit recovery to injunctive
relief.
On the other hand, in a jurisdiction requiring only negli-
gence for recovery under rule 10b-5, the imposition of an affirm-
ative obligation to disclose will raise the usual objections con-
cerning fairness to the innocent shareholder and the enormous
potential liability to the corporation.
156
C. Conclusion and Proposal
Given the foregoing consequences of an affirmative obliga-
tion to disclose, the net gains to be realized would be maximized
if the civil sanction resulting from all violations of affirmative
disclosure were limited to injunctive relief. The injunctive
measures available should include the suspension of trading
of the securities involved as well as ordering compliance with
the requirement of affirmative disclosure.1 7 Limiting the civil
sanctions to injunctive relief of this nature will allow realiza-
tion of the advantages of affirmative disclosure: (1) insider
cheating is still deterred; (2) a steady flow of information to
the securities markets is maintained; and (3) investors are given
the advantage of full disclosure. On the other hand, some of
the major disadvantages of an affirmative disclosure require-
ment are avoided: (1) spurious, court-clogging suits are elim-
inated; (2) management is not forced to waste time and re-
sources in over-disclosing as a means of "playing it safe;" and
(3) innocent shareholders avoid indirect liability. Most impor-
tantly, the objectives of the 1934 Act including those of general
fairness are satisfied simultaneously. Investors are provided
maximum information by a requirement of full disclosure, but
156See concurring opinion of Judge Friendly. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968).
157 These remedies are presently available for violation of the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act. See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
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they are not given windfall profits for losses sustained in dealing
at arm's length with someone who had no more access to cor-
porate information than they.
By limiting actions for nondisclosure (when there is no
corporate benefit) to a remedy of injunctive relief, the plaintiff
need only establish negligence on the part of the corporate
defendant. Therefore, the difficulties inherent in proving some
degree of scienter by a silent, nondealing corporation are elim-
inated. Nevertheless, a private party may still recover damages
for nondisclosure involving willful conduct if he can prove a
claim either of manipulation or deception, '5 or of aiding and
abetting."9 The SEC may also sue for willful nondisclosure
through section 32(a) of the 1934 Act.160
V. SUMMARY
The issue of whether a corporation has an affirmative
obligation to disclose material information has been presented
by many sources but remains unresolved. The reporting require-
ments of the 1934 Act succeed as periodic reports but fail as
current disclosures. They fail to achieve timeliness, and they
lack the dissemination necessary to inform the investing public.
The disclosure policies of the major stock exchanges are also
insufficient. They qualify substantively but are inadequate be-
cause of their limited applicability.
Rule 10b-5 is the most promising basis for affirmative dis-
closure. Yet a literal interpretation of this rule does not provide
sufficient authority for a general obligation to disclose. The
cases treating rule 10b-5 have also failed to address the question
directly. Nevertheless, they offer logical reasoning and judicial
policy which are consistent with an obligation of affirmative
disclosure. Given these precedents and the position of the SEC,
a progressive court could reasonably find an affirmative duty
of corporate disclosure.
The prospective consequences of a duty of affirmative dis-
closure suggest that the availability of an action for private
damages would create many problems without significantly
increasing the benefits. For this reason, it is submitted that
the rationale of rule lOb-5 should be extended to impose an
affirmative corporate obligation to disclose material information
and the sanction for violation of such obligation should be
limited to injunctive relief.
158 See cases cited notes 84-86 supra.
159 See note 89 supra.
160 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970).
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